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opinion.  126 
 The alternative view argues that LGBTQ rights are the result 
of hard-fought legislative and legal battles with these same dissenters and 
that equality will not be secure until, as a result of education and social 
pressure, such views have become so marginal as to be unacceptable. 
The former is a modus vivendi approach to the essentially contested 
question of sexual orientation. It does not insist on resolution of debates over 
status versus conduct. Religionists can continue to believe and teach the 
moral superiority of sexual expression in the context of opposite-sex 
marriage. They must concede, however, 
 that society has legislated against 
discrimination and hatred against persons of LGBT orientation and to confer 
legal recognition on their relationships with each other. This leaves some 
space for dissenters at various levels by limiting discriminatory actions, 
providing exceptions for distinctively religious activities and organizations, 
where the conflict over the nature of orientation is most acute, and leaving 
the realm of belief largely untouched. 
The rise and ascendancy of LGBTQ rights in Canada and the U.K. 
has taken place over a single generation. It should be no surprise then 
that not everyone has found it easy to adjust beliefs based on deep 
convictions while the societal consensus and the legal environment have 
shifted around them. Conscience claims by religious conservatives do not 
threaten the new order but they do challenge its liberal credentials to the 
core. To (once again) quote Justice Campbell in the Nova Scotia 
Barristers 'Society decision: 
The discomforting truth is that religions with views that many Canadians 
find incomprehensible or offensive abound in a liberal and multicultural 
society. The law protects them and must carve out a place not only 
where they can exist but flourish. 127 
Should Conscie iN Proxy a for  
IReligion in Some  
Richard Haigh* 
I. INTRODUCTION: IMMUNIZATION IN ONTARIO AND A 
FRACAS AT YORK UNIVERSITY 
Two seemingly disparate case studies provide a fascinating lens 
through which to examine religion in the public sphere. One involves the 
government's mandate to immunize school children and the allowable 
exemptions therefrom; the other a professor's online course that requires 
some group sessions on weekends, and a student's claim for an exemption 
from that activity. 
1. A Religious and Conscience Exemption from Immunization 
The Ontario Immunization of School Pupils Act' allows parents to 
exempt their children from the mandatory program of vaccination for 
diseases such as diphtheria, measles, mumps, poliomyelitis, rubella, and 
tetanus. The policy behind the Act is simple: parents must ensure that their 
children complete a prescribed program of immunization in relation to 
each of a number of designated diseases. Parents are entitled to exempt 
their child from the mandatory program on two bases: (i) a religious or 
conscience-based belief that runs counter to immunization; or (ii) a health-
related reason as determined by a physician or specified nurse. 
126 
A. Koppelman, "You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay 
People Should Have Religious Exemptions" (2006) 72 Brooklyn L. Rev. 125. 
127 TWUv. NSBS, infra, note 125, at 271.  
* Assistant professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; director of the York Centre for Public 
Policy and Law. Thanks to Amy Lee for research assistance and help with the York University 
religious-exemption case, Lillianne Cadieux-Shaw for research assistance, Barry Bussey and lain 
Benson for inviting me to participate in the Canadian Council of Christian Charities symposium on 
"Religion: A Public and Social Good", and the engaging discussion that took place after I spoke on 
this topic at the symposium. All have helped me refine my thoughts considerably. 
R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.1 [hereinafter the "Act"]. It bears noting that Bill 198, tabled in the 
legislature on May 12, 2016, proposed amending the Act to require those parents seeking a non-
medical exemption from immunization to first undergo an education session. The Bill received first 
reading but at the time of writing has not progressed further. 
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The Act is relatively straightforward, so it is worth quoting the 
relevant sections in their entirety: 
3. (1) The parent of a pupil shall cause the pupil to complete the 
prescribed program of immunization in relation to each of the 
designated diseases. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the parent of a pupil in respect of 
the prescribed program of immunization in relation to a designated 
disease specified by a physician or a registered nurse in the extended 
class in a statement of medical exemption filed with the proper medical 
officer of health and, where the physician or registered nurse in the 
extended class has specified an effective time period, only during the 
effective time period. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a parent who has filed a statement 
of conscience or religious belief with the proper medical officer of 
health. 
The defmition section clarifies some of the terms above as follows: 
"'designated diseases' means diphtheria, measles, mumps, poliomyelitis, 
rubella, tetanus and any other disease prescribed by the Minister of 
Health and Long-Term Care" and 
"statement of conscience or religious belief' means a statement by 
affidavit in the prescribed form by a parent of the person named in the 
statement that immunization conflicts with the sincerely held convictions 
of the parent based on the parent's religion or conscience... 
The religious exemption was first introduced when the Act was passed 
in 1982. At the time, Larry Grossman, the Progressive Conservative health 
minister, stated that the legislation would virtually eliminate measles, 
rubella or German measles, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, and mumps. The 
mandatory nature of the provision was incorporated in an attempt to 
ensure "herd immunity". To this effect, parents had to show proof of their 
immunization. The Act did, however, allow parents to exempt their 
children for medical and religious reasons but not for conscience-based 
reasons.' The Opposition approved of the legislation as well, noting the 
importance of the provisions safeguarding religious viewpoints.' 
2 JcL,s.1. 
Ontario Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Par!., 2nd session (June 29, 1982). 
Id., Ross McClellan, MPP Beliwoods,  
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A short two years later, the Act was amended to add "conscience" to 
the religious exemption (amendments also increased penalties for non-
compliance). In the Hansard debates over the amendment, the then-new 
Minister of Health, Keith Norton, stated that the revisions will 
extend the grounds for exemption from the immunization requirements 
to include grounds of conscience. 
At present, exemptions from compulsory immunization are allowed 
only on medical grounds or because of religious beliefs. A few children 
in the province have been excluded from school because of parental 
convictions that, though not religious, represent strong and deeply held 
philosophical views. We believe the law should respect these personal 
convictions. 
This amendment is particularly appropriate in the light of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees freedom of conscience 
and religion. We are advised by the Attorney General (Mr. McMurtry) 
that the broader exemption provision would be more consistent with the 
letter and the spirit of the Charter.' 
As he said later, during the Bill's second reading, the added exemption 
was not expected to affect the overall efficiency of the program. Minister 
Norton noted that since its inception in 1982 the religious exemption had 
been claimed by only 0.125 per cent of the pupils assessed to that date. 
Adding a conscience objection would not likely exceed 0.25 per cent of 
the school population.' Ultimately, it was the Government's belief that 
including conscience would ensure the entire Bill complied with the 
Charter's (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) intent.7 The Bill 
passed into law with little fanfare. 
Rare for a statute centred on rights, the Act enjoyed virtually universal 
support. The opposition Liberal party spokespersons congratulated the 
Progressive Conservative party for timely legislation, both in its original 
form and the amended 1984 version. Only a few, modest, reservations 
were observed: 
Mr. Sweeney: I want to take a minute to draw to the minister's attention 
that, because this conscience clause has been put in, some people in 
Ontario are going to have a small problem - for some people it may be a 
very large problem - in regard to the measles vaccine. 
Ontario Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 32nd Par!., 4th 
session (November 13, 1984) [hereinafter "Hansard Debates"]. 
6 Id. But see statistical results below at note 11 and accompanying text. 
Id, Hon. Keith Norton, December 11, 1982. 
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I would like to read a couple of comments into the record. I have a 
letter from one of my constituents that I was asked to bring to the 
minister's attention. 'When people feel so trapped in an ethical problem 
they can see no way out.. this I will admit is where many people 
may feel they would be, once aware of the situation regarding live 
attenuated vaccines.' 
The minister is well aware that it has been brought to our attention that 
these vaccines come from human cell culture that originally came from 
aborted foetuses.... The point my constituent has drawn to my attention 
that this new legislation she finds herself, as a matter of conscience, 
'trapped in an ethical problem'. 
... [T]here may be a considerable 
number of people who also find themselves trapped in this ethical 
problem [due to the source of the vaccine].' 
Minister Norton assured Mr. Sweeney that a foetus had never been 
aborted anywhere in the world for the purpose of manufacturing a 
vaccine. 
Robert Nixon, Liberal MPP for Brant-Oxford, feared that adding 
conscience would greatly increase the number of requests for exemptions 
and that the reasons for doing so would be trivial. As he said in the 
legislature, adopting the persona of a curious child, "Daddy, do I have 
to [get the needle]?" He went on: "There are people who will say, 
'No honey, you do not have to get the needle'.... [It] is broadened to the 
point where any kind of objection—I hesitate to use the word 'rational' 
in this connection 
... 
—is at least referred to in the bill."' In other words, 
Nixon was concerned that adding "conscience" as a basis for exemption 
could not be controlled in the way that a purely religious exemption 
could be. Norton did not respond to this floodgate concern. 
The Act has now been in place for almost 30 years. The process for 
obtaining an exemption is simple and has remained unchanged since 
1984. Parents must complete a pro forma affidavit stating simply that the 
requirements of the Act "conflict with my sincerely held convictions 
based on my religion or conscience" and sign it. There is no requirement 
to indicate on which of the two bases the exemption is sought. No further 
details are required regarding the specifics of the religious or 
conscientious belief. The affidavit is then filed with the Medical Officer 
of Health. 10 
Id., John Sweeney, MPP Kitchener-Wilmot. 
Id., Robert Nixon, Brant-Oxford-Norfolk. 
10 
It should be noted that the Act does have some potentially differential consequences for 
those children who have received an exemption from inoculation. According to s. 12 of the Act, 
The latest statistics related to exemption requests are contained in the 
report Immunization Coverage Report for School Pupils: 2012-13 School 
Year and show the following: in 2013, the exemptions for religion/ 
conscience were much higher than exemptions for medical reasons/ 
prior immunity (1.3-2.0% of the seven-year-old school population for 
religion/conscience reasons, depending on disease, as compared to prior 
immunity (0-0.1%) and medical reasons (0.1-0.4%)). Exemptions from 
polio (in 2013, 2.0% of seven-year-olds) and tetanus (1.7%) have 
steadily increased from 2008 to 2013. The MMR vaccine has the fewest 
number of exemptions (approximately 1 5%).11  Even at these levels, the 
percentage is still significantly higher than Norton's prediction that 
religious/conscience exemptions would not exceed 0.25 per cent of the 
school population; however, since the form does not distinguish, the 
specific breakdown between religious- versus conscience-based exemptions 
is unknown. 
The Report provides little more than a tentative conclusion. "It appears," 
it states, "that religious or philosophical exemptions may be increasing over 
time in Ontario as evidenced by an increasing proportion of 7-year-old 
students reporting religious and conscientious objections to tetanus and 
polio over the period of 2008-09 to 2012_13. 12  This is rendered even more 
tentative by a recognition that the five-year time frame is likely too short to 
draw firm conclusions given that the MIIVIR exemptions have remained 
relatively stable over the same period. 
2. A Religious Exemption at a University 
In September 2013, a male student living in the Greater Toronto Area 
(GTA) and enrolled in an online sociology course at York University 
requested to be opted out of a mandatory group assignment that required 
him to meet with his female classmates in person. His reason for wanting to 
be exempt from the group assignment was that his religion prevented him 
from associating with women in public. Initially, Professor J. Paul Grayson, 
the instructor, dismissed the request out of concern that it would give tacit 
pupils who have received an exemption can be excluded from school if an outbreak of any of the 
named diseases occurs. 
11 Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion (Public Health Ontario), Immunization 
Coverage Report for School Pupils: 2012-13 School Year (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario 
2014) [hereinafter the "Report"]. 
12 Id. 
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support to a negative view of women and set a disturbing precedent that 
sexist attitudes are acceptable at the University. 
In addition to personally rejecting the student's request, however, 
Grayson forwarded the student's request to his dean and the director of 
York's Centre for Human Rights. Grayson's hope was that the School 
could, in his opinion, "give a principled response" to the student that 
would back up his own decision. In a surprise turn, both the Dean and 
the Centre ordered Grayson to accommodate the student's request. At the 
risk of possible discipline, Professor Grayson refused the order. The 
School contacted the student to let him know that he was allowed to 
withdraw from the course with full refund. 
The Dean of the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, 
Martin Singer, 
 replied to Grayson in an open letter sent to the whole 
faculty, writing that two key factors underlay his decision. First, because 
the course was listed and offered exclusively as an online course, the 
student had a reasonable expectation that he would not be obliged to 
come to campus or to interact with other students in person. Singer cited 
the fact that an alternative arrangement to the in-person group assignment 
was made for another student of the same course who was taking the 
course abroad. Second, the University was bound by its obligations under 
the Ontario Human Rights Code to accommodate a student's religious 
beliefs. The Code mandates accommodation upon the satisfaction of 
three conditions: (1) the applicant is sincere in his convictions; (2) the 
accommodation must have no substantial impact on other students' 
experience in the class; and (3) the accommodation must not undermine 
the academic integrity of the course. The Dean's office, the University's 
Centre for Human Rights, the Office of the University Counsel, and the 
Office of Faculty Relations believed that the three conditions were met in 
this particular instance.13 
The matter did not end there. Grayson responded to the Dean's letter, 
arguing that a commitment to gender equality should not be overborne by 
a claim for religious accommodation, even if it fits within the scope of 
the Code. In Grayson's mind, to do otherwise was inconsistent with 
York's core values and would have infringed upon the right of female 
students to be treated with respect by male students. He held firm to the 
view that if York University was legally bound by the Code to make the 
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decision that it did, then the Code itself was unacceptable and in need of 
reform. 14 
Grayson also referenced what he saw as missing, but crucially 
relevant, information in the Dean's reasons. In terms of a student's 
reasonable expectation of distance learning via an online course, Grayson 
pointed out that the student at the centre of the controversy had come to 
campus on at least two other occasions to participate in other in-person 
courses. As well, Grayson believed that the course syllabus provided 
adequate notice to students that there would be a component of the 
course requiring in-person group attendance. Grayson also rejected the 
Dean's position that the student's religious accommodation request was 
analogous to the student who lived outside Canada. He saw the former as 
a request made on the basis of preference, whereas the latter was, to him, 
based on a real inability to attend in-person meetings. 
Moreover, Grayson contended that the proposed accommodation 
would have a substantial impact on other students' experiences in the 
class and therefore did not meet the second requirement of the Code. 
Like any good sociologist, he based this on a survey he had subsequently 
conducted in one of his classes, which used a fictitious scenario almost 
identical to the one that occurred. The results of the survey indicated 
that the accommodation would have led some female members of the 
class to feel belittled and humiliated. Out of 30 female students surveyed, 
15 female students indicated they would find the accommodation 
"ridiculous", "unfair", "offensive", "upsetting", "discriminating", 
"outrageous", "disappointing", or "confusing" or perceive it as a sign of 
favouritism, ranging in degree of negative reaction from mild to extreme. 
Of course, this meant that 15 female students respected or were indifferent 
to the male student's request for accommodation; of those, six approved 
and fully supported the decision to accommodate the student's minority 
religious belief. 15 
York's sociology department sided with Grayson, passing a motion 
on October 9, 2013, stating that "whereas it is recognized that York 
recognizes diversity, be it resolved that academic accommodations for 
students will not be made if they contribute to material or symbolic 
marginalization of other students, faculty or teaching assistants"." After 
13 J. Paul Grayson response to Dean Martin Siliger, entitled "Erosion of Rights of Female 
Students in York's Classrooms", dated December 9, 2013, at 2 (copy with author). 
Id. 
Id., at 9-11. 
Cited in id., at 5. 
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several unsuccessful attempts to sway the University's decision, Grayson 
broke the story to the media in January 2014. 
Predictably, when it comes to contentious religious matters, the story 
went viral. Much criticism and many comments came from a wide swath 
of members of the public. Even federal politicians, who in some sense 
should have no business discussing religious accommodation in the 
university sector, couldn't contain themselves. On Thursday, January 9, 
2014, Justice Minister Peter Mackay piped up, saying that "we did 
not send soldiers to Afghanistan to protect the rights of women to 
only see those same rights eroded here at home." He was joined by 
federal opposition leader Tom Mulcair, who also spoke out against the 
University's decision.17 
 At the provincial level, the Parti Québécois 
Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions, Bernard Drainville, and 
Ontario's Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities, Brad Duguid, 
also sided with Professor Grayson. Duguid acknowledged that the 
University had the authority to make its own decisions but added that "our 
universities should not be obliged to alter course curriculum in any way 
that would be seen as discriminatory with regard to gender equality." 
He considered this to be a "sacrosanct" principle." 
York did have its supporters. Raj Anand, a human rights lawyer and 
former Chief Commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, 
opined that the University's decision was legally defensible, as religious-
accommodation laws are designed to protect individuals against majority 
opinion. Alan Shefinan, a former director of communication and education 
with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, also affirmed York's 
decision to accommodate the student's request as a fair balancing of the 
factual circumstances of the request. 19 
17 
Both quotations come from T. Hopper, "York University standing by choice to excuse 
student from group work with women over religious beliefs", National Post, January 9, 2014, 
available online: <http://news.nationalpost.con1toronto/yorkuniver5ity..appearstobe5tdjgy 
 
18 Quoted in J. Bradshaw and A. Morrow, "York President Weighs in on religious rights 
controversy, calls for discussion", The Globe and Mail, January 13, 2014, available online: 
<httP:/!www.theglobeandmail.con1Jnews/national/educatiojyorkpresjdentweighsinonreljgjos 
rights-controversycajls_fordiscussiopJicle1632o159/> 
19 R. Anand, "Accommodation issue shows human rights principles are working", Toronto 
Star, January 18, 2014, available online: <http://www,thestar.com]opinionlconljnentary/2014/01/18/ 
accommodationJssueshows human rights_principles are working.html> 
The general feeling in the media, however, seemed to be that the 
University had got it wrong. The typical response was that religious 
freedoms did not operate in isolation and needed to be considered 
alongside other fundamental rights and values. Christopher D'Souza, an 
equity expert and author, challenged the University's opinion that the 
accommodation was not creating undue hardship for the women: "[t]he 
message [that the University] sent about gender equality was very 
skewed", he stated .2' David Matas, a lawyer specializing in human rights 
law, noted that distinctions needed to be made between freedom of 
religion in a public setting - call them external restraints on freedom of 
religion - and freedom of religion within a religious context - the 
internal debates over what is contemplated as religious. Discrimination 
that exists within a religion should not, for him, be projected into the 
public sphere via a simplistic claim of freedom of religion. This could 
potentially violate the rights of people who hold different religious 
beliefs or have no religion .2' Both Matas and D'Souza were of the 
opinion that, although there is no fixed hierarchy of human rights, the 
right to gender equality must predominate in this particular context. 
To defend the University's decision from the public criticism, York 
Provost Rhonda Lenton tried to decouple the student's religious motivations 
from the online nature of the course. In an official statement from 
the University, and in a number of newspaper and radio interviews, she 
argued that if the student had made the same request in an in-class 
course, it would have been highly unlikely that the University would 
have agreed to grant the accommodation request. In her statement she 
noted that "[a] s a secular institution, [York has an] expectation that males 
and females study alongside one another," reminding everyone that 
"accommodation is not limitless"." In a CBC Radio interview, she 
emphasized that the School does not prioritize religious accommodation 
over other types of rights and strove to point out that accommodation of 
pluralistic values is in fact made to encourage individuals to engage with 
public institutions. She made a personal promise to review York's 
decision-making processes regarding religious accommodation with 
20 Quoted in L. Buck, "York University student incident creates a national debate", The 
Cord, January 15, 2015, available online: <http:llwww.thecord.caIyorkuniversity-5tudentincident 
createsanational-debate>. 
21 Id. 
22 
"Statement from Rhonda Lenton, provost and vice-president academic", y File, January 9, 
2014, available online: <http://yfile,news.yorku,caJ2014/01/09/yOrkCOmmittethtOcreatingan 
inclusivelearningenvironmentforall/>. 
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other Ontario universities to "share the best way forward in these types 
of requests"." 
Lenton's responses were insufficient to placate some commentators, 
which led inevitably to the matter escalating to York's President and 
Vice-Chancellor, Mandouh Shoukri. On January 13, 2014, he released a 
statement on religious accommodation. In it, he emphasized that every 
request for accommodation is considered according to the individual 
merits of the request, with a view to reaching all decisions in a fair and 
reasonable manner. Surrounding all such requests was the context of the 
School as a secular institution. He referenced an earlier "Presidential 
Statement on the Secular University" issued by York in 2007, which 
affirmed York as a "tolerant, diverse and multicultural place" where 
"democratic and pluralistic values of Canadian society" are reflected. 
The 2007 statement forewarns that "those who have strong commitments 
to various faith communities or political ideologies may find their beliefs 
challenged by others." It reminded everyone that "religious accommodation 
cannot be implemented at the expense of the infringement of the rights 
of others."24 
As with much that captivates the media these days, the matter ended 
almost as abruptly as it started. The student at the centre of the controversy 
reached a resolution with Professor Grayson, and he eventually met with 
his co-ed group. According to Grayson, the student was ultimately satisfied 
that the matter was handled fairly, although he continued to maintain that 
his religion did allow for exceptions of this nature.25 
II. WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN? 
Clashes like the one at York are becoming common in the west 
- 
sometimes playing out as small incidents in classrooms and workplaces, 
23 
"Overruled?", Metro Morning, January 10, 2014, available online: <http://www.cbc.cal 
 
metromorning/episodes/2014/01/1o/oveled/> 
24 
"Statement from York University President Mamdough Shoukri on Religious 
Accommodation", January 13, 2014, available online: <http://yfile,news.yorku.caJ20 14/01/13/ 
and "Presidential Statement on the Secular University", dated February 8, 2007, available online: 
%20The%20Secular%20University.pdf> ("2007 Statemnt"). 
25 
Personal interview with J. Paul Grayson, June 9, 2014. For a trenchant analysis of 
the case, see R. Moon, "Religious Accommodation and its Limits: The Recent Controversy at 
York University" (2014) 23 (1) Constitutional Forum 9 [hereinafter "Moon"]. Religious freedom 
does not always fit comfortably within an equality rights framework. 
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sometimes as singular and tragic events, such as the massacre of Charlie 
Hebdo staff in Paris. 
For the most part, Canada's broad and open immigration policies, 
multiculturalism, increased diversity, and pluralism have combined to 
give rise to an amazing social and cultural mosaic, but they have no 
doubt also contributed to flashpoints like the one at York. Accommodating 
religious beliefs can be complex, partly because of the nearly infinite 
ways in which religious beliefs are manifested and partly because there is 
a need among the non-religious or differently religious to adopt an 
imaginative perspective regarding beliefs and practices that is not always 
achievable. 
The Supreme Court of Canada's test for assessing whether something 
is religious is tremendously broad. To meet the test, all one need do is 
show that a practice - such as not sitting down face-to-face with female 
students - is, firstly, connected with a higher purpose. That higher 
purpose itself is not easily established. But as the majority of the 
Supreme Court put it in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, at least if the 
outer limits are defined as "beliefs, convictions and practices rooted 
in religion, as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or 
conscientiously held," it is safe to say that they are protected by the 
guarantee of freedom of religion.26 The majority went on to note that 
"religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of 
faith and worship" that tends to manifest itself as a "belief in a divine, 
superhuman or controlling power, "27 
Second, the practice that must be related to the belief is one that is 
almost entirely within the subjective appreciation of the claimant - in 
this case, that the student's own understanding of his religion forbids 
sitting down with women. This subjectivity allows a near infinite variety 
of practices: no one has to cite scripture or refer to religious experts to 
support their position. A religion is pretty much one's own. All one need 
do is assert, in good faith and sincerely, that a particular practice or belief 
has a nexus with religion .2' Again, to quote directly from the majority 
decision in Amselem, these are "deeply held personal convictions or 
26 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 39 
(S.C.C,) [hereinafter "Amselem"]. 
27 Id. 
28 Of course, "sincerity" and "nexus" have their own substantive components but, as is well 
known, these are relatively easy for a claimant to establish (however, see notes 35-40 and 
accompanying text below for a sampling of cases where the courts have failed to find more than a 
trivial infringement or a nexus with religion). 
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beliefs connected to an individual spiritual faith and integrally linked to 
one self-definition and spiritual fulfilment". The practice of religion 
allows "individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the 
subject or object of that spiritual faith."" 
To see how this has played out in a constitutional law context, it is 
worth examining some of the kinds of things that have been successfully 
protected as religiously based activities in constitutional cases. For 
example, wearing a kirpan to school in an environment where no weapons 
are allowed;" avoiding having a photographic driver's licence where 
drivers are expected to have one;3' seeking to install a private succah on 
one's balcony (where built elements are forbidden) and a communal 
succah is thought by others of the same faith to be acceptable;32 refusing 
blood transfusions where the bulk of medical opinion suggests that to do 
so could be fatal;` and refusing to participate in a daily prayer reading 
where the bulk of students or staff are in favour of it.34 
Just as instructive are those cases where a religious freedom was claimed 
but a court found it not to exist, either because (i) the practice or belief has 
no nexus with religion; or (ii) the interference was deemed to be trivial or 
insubstantial. In category (i) are included such cases where a claimant's 
belief that the cannabis plant is sacred to his "Church of the Universe" and 
thus the use of marijuana is a religious one;" where the fact that the British 
monarchy's royal-succession rules adhere to certain sectarian principles is 
not connected to an individual's own religious beliefs;" and where the ideas 
and practices of the Humanics Institute, including a "Oneness of Reality", 
are so vague as to be practically unascertainable and therefore not connected 
Amselem, supra, note 26, at para. 39 (emphasis added). 
° Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 
S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.). 
31 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter "Wilson Colony"]. 
32 Amselem, supra, note 26. 
u B. (P) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.). 
l Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] O.J. No. 1488, 65 OR. 
(2d) 641 (Ont. CA.). Of course, not all of these cases were ultimately successful, but all passed the 
first hurdle of establishing a breach of freedom of religion. The cases almost all turn on whether the 
government is justified in limiting the freedom under s. 1 of the Charter, but that is less relevant to 
the purpose intended here. 
° Bennett v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] F,C,J. No. 1598, 2011 FC 1310 (F.C.), 
revd [2013] F.C.J. No. 717, 2013 FCA 161 (F.C.A.). 
36 Chainnigh v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] F.C.J. No. 53, 2008 FC 69 (F.C.). 
to religion.37  Cases where courts have found the interference to be trivial 
include the challenge of a Calgary by-law prohibiting amplified sound 
because it prohibited a person from attempting to proselytize to pedestrians 
in front of City Hall;` a requirement to file annual tax returns being contrary 
to a religious or conscientious belief because of government policies 
allowing abortion;39  a Passport Canada policy that prohibited the inclusion 
of "Israel" as the country of birth;" a Highway Traffic Act provision 
requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets;41 and Sarnia zoning legislation that 
prohibited a Christian fellowship organization from operating a men's 
shelter,42 
Once religious freedom is triggered by showing that a practice has a 
nexus to religion, the question of whether the law's interference with the 
implicated right is trivial or insubstantial is assessed objectively. If it is 
found to be significant enough, then there is, prima fade, an infringement 
of freedom of religion. That, the Supreme Court says, is enough.43  
It's not a difficult burden to meet. Gurbaj Singh, a Sikh student in a 
grade school in Quebec, was allowed to attend school wearing a kirpan 
- 
a religious and ceremonial dagger - because he claimed it was a 
religious object and part of his duty as a religious practice to wear it. 
Non-Sikhs, in contrast, are not allowed to carry knives. The Supreme 
Court found that all Gurbaj had to do was establish that his personal and 
subjective belief in the religious significance of the kirpan was sincere. 
He did not have to establish that a kirpan isn't a weapon or that Sikhism 
requires wearing one. The School had to accommodate his religious 
belief since it was relatively straightforward to do so. 
The rationale for treating the bulk of a freedom-of-religion claim in a 
subjective manner is both practical and principled. Courts are public 
institutions - there is no place for them in the pews of the nation. But 
this subjective approach brings potential challenges. Under it, it is very 
hard for anyone to maintain that my belief - however unusual or even 
socially disruptive it might seem to others - is not valid. There needs to 
" Humanics Institute v. Minister of National Revenue, [2014] F.C.J, No. 1127, 2014 FCA 
265 (F.C.A.). 
'° R. v. Pawlowski, [2011] A.J. No. 189, 509 AR. 1 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter "Pawlowski"). 
39 R. v. Little, [2009] N.B.J. No. 276,349 N.B.R. (2d) 54,246 C.C.C. (3d) 508 (N.B.C.A.). 
° Veffer v. Canada (Minister ofForeign Affairs), [2007] F.C.J. No. 908, 2007 FCA 247 (F.C.A.). 
41 R. v. Badesha, [2011] O.J. No. 2564, 2011 ONCJ 284 (Ont. C.J.). 
42 Sarnia (City) v. River City Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Sarnia (Trustees of), [2014] 
O.J. No. 2193, 22 M.P.L.R. (5th) 35 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
° See S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chénes, [20121 S.C.J. No, 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235, at 
para. 23 (S.C.C.), 
216 RELIGION, LIBERTY AND THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF LAW SHOULD CONSCIENCE BE A PROXY FOR RELIGION 217 
be sincerity in that belief and some connection to a basic idea of religion 
(related to the divine, or spiritual faith), but nothing more than that. So 
the York student fervently believed his religion did not allow contact 
with females (at least in a student setting)." He was sincere in that belief 
(at least initially; he later recanted in some way, since he ended up 
attending the weekend session). The University accepted that belief and 
determined that the only reasonable way to accommodate him was 
granting a dispensation from the weekend retreat. 
No doubt accommodation, which allows difference to flourish, may 
sometimes seem unfair to those who must do the accommodating (and 
even discriminatory to those who are not offered the same treatment). 
Those feelings can be hard to shake, as attested by Grayson and a 
significant number of the surveyed students who felt demeaned. But 
accommodating religion is one legal method we use in Canada to strive for 
a society that remains uninterested in religious beliefs. It's a necessary 
paradox by vigorously maintaining reasonable accommodation of 
religious beliefs, we actually protect the secular nature of our state. In my 
view, this is an important value to maintain.45  
But secularity is not the same as neutrality. As a way around this false 
equivalence, in terms of religious legal disputes, it might be useful 
sometimes to frame them as grounded in conscience instead of religion. 
Non-religious viewpoints, based on claims of conscience, can function in 
a similar way to the comprehensive claims to the truth made by religions. 
Conscience-based claims are, for want of a better term, secular, but they 
also comprise a distinct point of view and therefore are not "neutral". As 
Suzanne Chiodo reasons, casting secularism as neutral makes it the 
44 And despite the fact that some commentators noted that there is no religion they are 
aware of that forbids such a practice: see, for example, Grayson's statement that he consulted a 
scholar of Judaism and two Islamic scholars, neither of whom saw any religious reason for a person 
not wanting to interact with women (supra, note 13, at 4) and S. Khan, "What York University 
forgot: Gender equality is not negotiable", The Globe and Mail, January 10, 2014, available online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com]globedebate/whatyorkuniver5ityforgotgeflderequaljtyisno. 
negotiable/artic1e16278726/>. (Khan characterizes the student's request as one based on cultural 
preference, not religious doctrine.) 
° It might be much more preferable to think of the nature of our state as "impartial" 
- 
more analogous to judges, who are permitted to hold opinions and have sympathies but throughout 
must be seen to be impartial (i.e., without bias). In fact, the Canadian Judicial Council's "Ethical 
Principles for Judges" refrains from using the term "neutral", preferring "impartial" throughout. Our 
secular state should be free from bias as between different conceptions of the truth, of goodness, etc., 
but perhaps can never be neutral, since that implies there is some baseline position that somehow can 
be located. That said, I'm not unaware of the controversy over defining the term "secularism" and 
the fact that it has been described more as a continuun of ideas rather than a fixed concept; see 
Simoneau v. Tremblay, L201 11 Q.H.R.T.J. No. 1, [2011] R.J.Q. 507 (Que. H.R,T,). 
arbiter of "non-neutral" claims, especially religion. While public debate 
is centred around so-called neutral claims based on reason, more 
controversial claims of comprehensive truth are, she argues, relegated to 
the background because they cannot be resolved through reason.46 Not, 
I argue, if we give more weight to the Charter protection of conscience. 
Section 2(a) of the Charter47 states that everyone has freedom of 
conscience and religion. Yet the constitutional protection of conscience 
is, at best, just a silent partner to religion and, at worst, often ignored or 
unnoticed. I have argued that the deliberate inclusion of "conscience" in 
section 2(a) of the Charter ought to be taken seriously; to do so, freedom 
of conscience must be recognized as an independent and robust freedom. 
A fully developed freedom of conscience might bring a less divisive, 
morality-based freedom into the foreground as the primary freedom, 
subsuming some forms of religious freedom within it and ultimately 
proving less contentious and less driven by emotion.48 The Supreme 
Court has hinted at a more robust approach to section 2(a) in a few asides 
in some of its religious-freedom cases: "conscience" could include such 
things as "conscientiously-held beliefs ... grounded in ... secular morality";" 
the positions of "atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned"';" 
and "profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, 
humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of 
being."51  
46 s Chiodo, "Reconsidering Creed: Exchanging Secularism for Genuine Pluralism in 
Canadian Human Rights Discourse", Creed (Ontario Human Rights Commission Legal Workshop 
Papers, 2012) [hereinafter "Creed Report"]. 
47 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter "Charter"]. 
48 My doctoral dissertation was based on this premise: "A Burl on the Living Tree: Freedom 
of Conscience in s. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (University of Toronto, 
2012). See also R. Haigh and P. Bowal, "Whistleblowing and Freedom of Conscience: Towards a 
New Legal Analysis" (Spring, 2012) 35 Dalhousie L.J. 89 and H. Kislowicz, R. Haigh and A. Ng, 
"Calculations of Conscience: The Costs and Benefits of Religious and Conscientious Freedom" 
(2011) Alta. L. Rev. 679-714. 
49 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 179 (S.C.C.) (Wilson J. 
concurring in result). 
50 Wilson Colony, supra, note 31, at para. 90 (citing the European Court in Kokkinakis v. 
Greece (May 25, 1993), Series A no, 260-A (E.C.H.R.)). 
51 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [19861 2 S.C.R. 713, at 759 
(5 CC.), quoted in Pawlowski, supra, note 38, at para. 88. A few lower court cases have relied on 
the conscience arm of s. 2(a) in their reasoning: for example (not an exhaustive list), see R. v. Lewis, 
[1996] B.C.J. No. 1254, 36 C.R.R. (2d) 364 (B.C.S.C.); Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship), [1994] F.C.J. No. 33, [1994] 2 F.C. 406 (F.C.T.D.) and Maurice 
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] F.C.J. No. 72, [2002] 215 F.T.R. 315 (F.C.T.D.). 
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Undoubtedly, religion and conscience have much in common both 
historically and theoretically. But in a legal, constitutional sense they 
should be treated separately. Freedom of conscience can function as a fully 
realized, independent freedom, since its meaning is sufficiently distinct 
from "religion". Different religions and individual consciences manifest 
themselves in a nearly limitless variety of forms, often diametrically 
opposed to one another. The major religions, for example, have vastly 
different views on what might be the ultimate purpose or divine 
understanding of the universe. Even more everyday religious beliefs (or 
social customs that often are associated with religious practices) can lead 
in different directions: many Jews and Muslims do not eat pork, while 
many Hindus do not eat beef each of them relate these practices to 
religious dogma. We can see similar effects surrounding conscience-based 
beliefs: Martin Luther's conscience compelled him to attack the Catholic 
Church while Thomas More's required him to defend it. Conscientious 
objectors feel compelled to object to military service while others may 
have a conscientious belief that fighting and dying for one's country is the 
best path. As Wilhelm Mensching says, two people can arrive at opposite 
conclusions and yet both can be making a decision based on conscience.52 
All of this means that claims of constitutional freedom of conscience can 
be modelled on requirements that are similar to the way religious-freedom 
claims have been delineated in cases such as Amselem. 
This is where the law relating to the anti-vaccinationists and the York 
rule regarding male-only students part ways. I believe we should 
take seriously the difference that the role of conscience plays between 
each set of cases. The Immunization of School Pupils Act expressly 
acknowledges the idea that conscience can be a determining factor in a 
parent deciding whether to allow her child to be inoculated. As Minister 
of Health Norton noted, the reason for adding conscience to the law in 
1984 was a direct result of the wording of section 2(a) of the Charter, 
which suggested conscience as a fundamental freedom distinct from 
religion: "[i]n trying to bring this bill clearly into compliance with the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it extends the grounds of exemption 
to include ... matters of conscience. ,53 
In contrast, a large part of the furor in the York case arose out of a 
(misplaced) belief that the student's claim was another in a long line of 
2 W. Mensching, Conscience (Ian Hagerty & Caroline Nicholson Jacob, trs., Pendle Hill 
Pamphlets, 1961), at 10-11. 
n flansard Debates, supra, note 5. 
examples that showed how out of touch some religious ideas (notably, and 
frequently, those associated with radical Islam) are to a modern state such 
as Canada. This view is usually couched in more palatable language, but at 
its heart is a feeling that some religions, or some religious practices, are 
inferior and less deserving of protection than others. 
However, if we imagine a slightly different situation at York, we can see 
how arguments based on conscience might tease out new ways to view 
religious arguments. If a student claimed he could not sit down with female 
students because it has been instilled in him since birth by his parents that it 
is wrong to sit together for long periods of time if you are not married, 
would we feel differently? Would our answer change if the student had been 
told his entire life that men are superior and should not demean themselves 
by meeting with women?" These questions respond to suspect values that 
may have been culturally or socially instilled. What about a belief that relies, 
instead, on "science" that may be suspect: the student could not sit with the 
opposite gender because mixing genders can lead to serious problems of 
germ transference and a heightened chance of infection? 
How to assess such conscience-based reasons? Would they be treated 
differently? Is the reason for the conscience-based exemption itself 
important? If it is, does this mean the reason for a religious-based 
exemption is important too? Yet, since religious accommodation is 
granted without inquiring into the religious basis for the reason, should 
not conscience- and religion-based arguments be treated the same? 
Would the possibility of accommodating these reasons change your view 
of the religious accommodation? 
Oftentimes (though not always!), I think assessing religious claims 
is analogous to Justice Potter Stewart's famous dictum regarding 
pornography: "I know it when I see it."" Religious claims raise considerable 
54 See Canada Trust Co v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1990] O.J. No. 615, 74 O.R. 
(2d) 481 (Ont. CA.); also see Spence v. BMO Trust Company, [2015] O.J. No. 353, 123 O.R. (3d) 611 
(Out. S.C.J.) (revd [2016] O.J. No. 1162, 2016 ONCA 196 (Ont. CA,). In Spence, the trial judge found 
that a deceased's will against public policy as it cut out a daughter who had married and bore a child 
with a Caucasian husband. Although the Court of Appeal reversed, one could say that the trial decision 
took the public notion of human rights about as far into the private-law realm as it can go. 
n Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964 U.S.S.C.) (concurring). The exact text of his 
judgment was "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing 
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Paul Gewirtz 
has written an excellent article on how this phrase is much more than a judicial cop-out and, in fact, 
contains much that should be admired in legal reasoning (in essence, the importance of non-rational 
elements in judicial decision-making): P. Gewirtz, "On 'I Know it When I See it", (1996) 105 Yale 
L.J. 1023. 
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emotional responses. We should acknowledge, as Potter Stewart J. did, the 
non-rational in helping us through these difficult questions. Many 
clinicians and public health workers exhibit frustration over vaccine 
hesitancy; it is all too common a belief that with additional education and 
rational understanding the hesitancy will go away.56 The truth is more 
complicated: this kind of wishful thinking is based on underestimating the 
power of non-cognitive dimensions of religiosity and of other deeply held 
convictions. Thinking about religious claims in the broader terms provided 
by conscience provides a helpful way out of this short-sightedness 
- it 
functions somewhat the same as knowing pornography when you see it. It 
helps legitimize and provide additional context to some claims at the same 
time it may assist in pointing out more clearly others that are spurious. 
If one is able to test claims by substituting a conscience-based reason 
for the religious one, interesting things sometimes happen. Take Wilson 
Colony, Multani and Mouvement laIque québécois v. Saguenay (City)57 as 
examples. If we change the Wilson Colony claimants from Hutterites to 
conscientious objectors who believe strongly against having identity 
photographs taken, would the situation change? Similarly, would we feel 
the same about a schoolchild who wished to bring a knife to school 
because he felt compelled to do so for reasons related to his conscience? 
One's reaction to these questions can help situate the problem when it is 
presented as a religious claim. 
One of the Supreme Court of Canada's more recent religious-freedom 
claims centred around religiously tinged municipal council meetings 
(because they included recitation of a prayer before the business of the 
meeting began)." Would it be a problem if, instead of reciting the Lord's 
Prayer at a civic meeting, a mayor recited some message about virtue, 
peace, and the human spirit? It is hard to imagine anyone taking issue 
with this: it would not offend either one's freedom of religion or of 
conscience. Because the message is somewhat anodyne, and certainly 
unlikely to offend, it most likely would be tolerated. If this is true, then 
sometimes a "secular" version of activities that have religious referents 
may be considered acceptable (assuming for the sake of argument that 
56 Thus, Bill 198's modification to the Act requiring parents undergo an "education session" 
prior to obtaining an exemption from immunization see supra, note 1. 
' [2015] S.C.J. No. 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
58 These are the basic facts that gave rise to the dispute in Mouvement laique qué béco is v. 
Saguenay (City), id. In that decision, the Court reasoned that at a public meeting of a municipal 
council, a mayor should refrain from prayer, or other sectarian religious activities, as these are 
exclusionary. The Court took a fairly strong stand about "neutrality" of the State, which may run 
counter to some of the arguments I mentioned above (see, supra, text to notes 44-45). 
my simplified mayoral statements are treated as a form of conscience-
based speech). It is not because of their secular nature, however, that I 
think these kinds of readings would pass constitutional muster. It is 
because they are examples of conscience-based information that are pan-
religious and universal. A reading by a mayor that is deliberately focused 
on one religion is not acceptable in a pluralist society. In contrast, a 
moral admonition - if the mayor said, before each meeting, "We wish 
that everyone here does good" - is uncontroversial only because it 
would likely pass as valid for every religion known to humans. In sum, 
when replaced with a conscience-based claim, the religious analysis can 
sometimes be sharpened. 
Of course, thinking of potential flashpoints in terms of conscience as 
opposed to religion is not a panacea. Conscience-based claims make sense 
in two main cases: (i) where a legislature determines that there may be 
good reasons, even if non-rational, for broadening religious-based claims 
to include similar conscience-based ones; and (ii) where the framing of 
the analytical problem is relatively straightforward. The first case is 
easiest: the classic conscience-based objection to a law occurred where 
pacifists objected to mandatory military service. As with the evolution 
of vaccination exemptions described at the outset of this chapter, 
conscientious objection to military service was originally granted to those 
religions that forbade going to war. Later on, governments allowed non-
religious conscientious objectors to exempt themselves from military 
service.59  In both situations, however, those in charge of assessing the 
veracity of the belief were clear that a person was only eligible to make the 
claim if they had a profound and demonstrable objection to war. In 
contrast, many would argue that parents who seek a vaccine exemption for 
their child are doing so based on purely unfounded, unscientific beliefs (or, 
at a minimum, highly contestable empirical evidence).60 So, if it makes 
sense for governments to allow for religious exemptions because some 
religions are opposed to the practice, then it makes sense to allow for 
conscientious exemptions on the basis that conscience-based beliefs are 
little different from subjective religious beliefs. 
n See, for example, G. Ruebsaat, The First Freedom: Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
in Canada, Freedom of Conscience Series No. 2 (Victoria, B.C.: Conscience Canada Inc., 1989). 
60 A typical rationalist account is summarized in a piece by André Picard, the Globe and 
Mail's health reporter: A. Picard, "Vaccination is for the greater good" in The Globe and Mail, 
February 3, 2015, at Al2. Picard's colourful language is instructive: "beliefs are rooted in scientific 
ignorance ... and it's much easier to find unabashed nonsense than easily digestible scientific fact 
"a chilling disregard for rational argument". 
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The second case, that presented by the York University situation, is 
more difficult. Examined through the frame of religious accommodation, 
the student should be offered an alternative to meeting with other 
students. The student felt that his religious freedom, as described in the 
Charter and the Ontario Human Rights Code, was infringed. As the 
University determined, he met the three requirements that determine 
whether accommodation is required.6' There is no requirement to go 
behind the subjectivity of the claimant's belief. In other words, just as 
abstaining from eating pork may not be strictly rational, or scientifically 
valid, it is protected simply because it is a religious and cultural practice 
for some believers. In my view, if this was the end of the argument, then 
a conscience-based reason for an accommodation should exist as well. 
However, because the problem can also be framed as one of equality, it is 
more complex. A significant number of female students in the class felt 
they were being discriminated against because of their gender, also 
contrary to the Charter and the Ontario Human Rights Code. To them, 
accommodation of any sort is tantamount to condoning discrimination. 
Since the case is capable of two diametrically opposed analyses, adding 
conscience to the mix is of limited utility. The real struggle is determining 
how the problem should be framed.62 
In the end, I believe that the Ontario Government's approach to 
vaccination is the best route to go 
- wherever possible, expressly 
allowing conscience and religion to be used in tandem, wherever there 
are activities that are open to a variety of approaches, clarifies the law 
and could help to move more problems inside the two categories 
described above. 
In addition, allowing conscience to operate instead of, or in addition to, 
religion may help defuse delicate situations. As the Ontario Government 
report on school immunization notes, parents' decisions whether to exempt 
their children on the basis of religious reasons as opposed to philosophical 
reasons has been completely uncontroversial." The conscience and 
religious exemptions are both accepted as bases for refusing inoculation. 
As with religious accommodation, allowing claims based on philosophical 
or conscience-based reasons is fundamentally about preventing margi-
nalization of minority groups and the negative effect on the dignity of 
61 See text to supra, note 13. 
62 See Moon, supra, note 25, for an expanded version of this argument. 
63 The Report, supra, note 11. 
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individuals whose identity is connected with such groups .6' What if the 
York rules allowed students to opt out of certain components of a course 
for "religious or conscientious reasons" without having to explain further 
the reason for so doing? Would it change the way we characterize and 
assess the exemption? My guess is that it would.65 
Our relative peacefulness in Canada - the lack of killings over religious 
cartoons, for instance - is not something we have stumbled upon or 
realized through luck. We have aligned the law with an ideal but practical 
kind of justice: developing broad approaches to religious accommodation 
and allowing, in a few instances, non-religious conscientious beliefs to be 
equally protected. Accommodations have generally worked, albeit with 
some controversy. Perhaps adding conscience protection to many other 
situations - where it makes obvious sense - will further improve our 
ability to withstand complex and difficult cultural, political, sociological, 
religious and legal entanglements. A modern Canada deserves no less. 
64 See R. Moon, "Accommodation and Compromise under s. 2(a) of the Charter", Creed 
Report, supra, note 46, at 59.1. 
65 As sociologists have noted, people tend to "mix and match" components of religion in 
idiosyncratic and often contradictory ways: see R. Bibby, Unknown Gods: The Ongoing Story of 
Religion in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993). And the growth of "no religion" is increasing - as 
Siobhan Chandler notes, the "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR) subculture is on the increase; see 
S. Chandler, "Private religion in the public sphere: inner life spirituality in civil society" in S. Aspers & 
D. Houtman, eds., Religions of Modernity: Relocating the Sacred to the Self and the Digital (Leiden: 
Brill, 2010), at 69. It is one reason why both religious- and conscience-based reasons for refusing to 
vaccinate one's children is troubling for many health care practitioners but is a key component of a 
strong belief in personal autonomy. Many similarities would exist in a classroom setting, 
